Introduction.
The most rapid population growth in the U.S. is in the urban areas of the semiarid West. This growth is fueled by shifts from agriculture and extractive industries to service and. technology industries. Most western cities, such as Los Angeles and Las Vegas, do not have sufficient local water sources to supply this growth in urban demand. Accordingly, there is effort to acquire water from agriculture, where approximately 70-75 percent of western water is allocated. But this process generally is slow and controversial, resulting in sharp differences in urban and agricultural water prices. 1 To better understand the problems that impede water rights transfers, I examine the notorious Owens Valley water transfer to Los Angeles. This exchange was the first large-scale market transfer of water rights in the American West. As described below, subsequent sizable, voluntary water trades from agriculture to urban areas have been rare.
Beginning in 1905, representatives of the Los Angeles Board of Water and Power
Commissioners purchased land and appurtenant water rights from some 869 farmers and 825 town lot owners. By 1934, the agency had acquired 95 percent of the agricultural acreage and 88 percent of the town properties in the valley. Ewan, 2000, 42; Wheeler, 2002 ). 4 Although difficult to test, the Owens Valley legacy appears to have been harmful for development of water markets. Ostrom (1971, 449) claimed it deterred efforts to re-allocate water from Northern California to urban centers in the south, and Haddad (2000, xv) argued that the "Ghost of Owens Valley" inhibited all proposed water transfers from rural areas to cities in the West. Hanak (2003, 5, 123) pointed to the Owens Valley experience in motivating county restrictions on water transfers in California. The 1974 movie, "Chinatown," staring Jack Nicholson and Faye Dunaway, dramatized conspiracies involving Owens Valley water and land speculation in Los Angeles, adding to its negative notoriety. 5 Indeed, the negotiations between the city and land owners were often acrimonious, and in total, they took some 30 years to complete, although the key period was from 1924 to 1934. During that time most land and water rights were purchased and most of the violence accompanying the negotiations took place. The aqueduct was periodically dynamited during bargaining impasses, investigative committees were sent by the Governor, Legislature, and Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce in attempts to resolve disputes between land owners and the Water Board, and the national press termed the conflict, "California's little Civil War." The task then is to explain why the negotiations over land and water rights took so long and why they were so rancorous, leaving a harmful legacy for later water transfers.
The analysis of Owens Valley negotiations makes use of detailed records-letters, reports, memorandums from 1905 to 1934 between the Los Angeles Water Board, its land agents, and land owners in the Owens Valley as deposited in the Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power Archives. These documents describe the bargaining history between the Board and farmers as they negotiated over land and water rights.
Bargaining positions, strategies, and key issues of contention are described in the data.
Additionally, there is a compilation of 869 farm land purchases, including year of purchase, amount paid, location of property, name of owner, as well as other property characteristics. These data are used in the econometric analysis. Other data sets exist for sellers' pool membership and for town lot sales.
The information provides a rich basis for examining the bargaining conflicts that occurred in Owens Valley in a manner that has not been done previously. The added transaction costs of negotiating land and water rights sales in the early 20 th century centered on three issues: disputes over valuation of property, bi-lateral monopoly, and third-party effects. Insights from the analysis not only explain why the Owens Valley negotiations were so lengthy and contentious, but also why current transfer efforts are so difficult. 6 The study of Owens Valley adds empirical content to basic transaction costs concepts.
II. An Overview of the Owens Valley Water Transfer.
Between 1880 and 1900, the population of Los Angeles grew five fold, from 50,393 people to 250,000, and given the city's climate, links via the intercontinental railroads, and position as a major West Coast port, prospects for continued growth seemed promising, except for the absence of sufficient water. The city averaged just 14.62 inches of precipitation, whereas Chicago, for example had mean rainfall of 34.12 inches. 7 Los Angeles relied upon the meager Los Angeles river watershed for its water supply, but by the turn of the century, there was growing concern among city boosters that more water had to be found if the city were to achieve prominence on the west coast. 8 Owens Valley on the eastern slopes of the Sierras, some 250 miles to the northeast (Figure 1 ), offered some 37 million acre feet (a.f.) of water from the Owens River flow and ground water, about the same as that held in Lake Mead today (Miller, 1977, 49-50) .
Figure 1
The Owens Valley, approximately 120 miles long and 2 to 6 miles wide, was bisected by the Owens River that eventually dumped into an alkaline, desert sump, Owens Lake. In 1920 there were 7,031 people in the area on farms and in five towns- These negotiations, however, were much more difficult than were the earlier purchases, taking some 10 years to complete for the most valuable properties. Ultimately, the Board secured 145,867 acres of farmland and 1,300 town parcels in Owens Valley. 14 The lands of primary interest to the Board were those that carried the most water, and generally they were part of formal irrigation ditch companies. The construction of ditches required cooperative investments so that farmers joined to incorporate mutual ditch companies and to place joint appropriative water claims. The amount of water held by each farmer was directly linked to the number of shares owned in the ditch company.
Once the Water Board completed purchase of a farm located on a ditch, its water allocation, as well as any water held via riparian rights, could be released to flow down river to the aqueduct. As we will see, however, these ditch companies provided a ready organizational device for farmers in bargaining with the city.
III. Transaction costs:
Valuation Disputes, Bi-lateral Monopoly, and Third-Party Effects.
The notion of transaction costs used here is a standard one, the costs of discovering, negotiating, and completing the exchange of an asset, in this case, waterbearing lands. Broadly speaking, exchange requires locating the relevant parties;
communicating information about the asset to be traded and terms of trade (offer and ask prices); inspection, verification, and measurement of the asset; negotiation to reach a sale price over mutually-accepted asset attributes and property rights; and finally, contract drafting and enforcement. The transaction costs literature emphasizes that each of these activities can be complex, affecting the timing, extent, and nature of trade (Coase, 1937 (Coase, , 1960 Barzel, 1982; Dahlman 1979; Demsetz; 1964 , 1968 and Williamson 1979, 1981 The market in which negotiations took place was the agricultural land market.
Water was bundled with the land under both the appropriative and riparian water rights doctrines. With appropriative rights, the priority and amount of water were linked directly to the property. 19 Riparian rights also tied stream water to adjacent land.
Accordingly, the Water Board had to purchase farm land in order to acquire the water for the'aqueduct. In bargaining between farmland owners and the Water Board between 1924 and 1934 there were three general classes of problems that impeded agreement, although they overlapped: valuation disputes, bi-lateral monopoly conflicts, and thirdparty effects.
Valuation Disputes.
There were two conflicts in determining prices for Owens Valley lands. One was the basis for general valuation of farm properties-whether the estimated water supply on a farm should be valued as an input to agricultural production in Owens Valley or as an input to land value increases in Los Angeles. This was principally a negotiation issue.
The second was the determination of the value of any particular property when farms were heterogeneous. This was both a measurement and a negotiation issue. In terms of because their extra water did not increase output correspondingly and instead was devoted to low-valued uses. These farmers typically held out for higher prices.
In negotiations, each farm owner had the most complete information about the agricultural potential of his property and the amount of water held, but at the same time, had incentive to exaggerate their values. Accordingly, to assemble offer prices, the Board relied upon a committee of expert appraisers to assimilate local farm price information. To reduce disputes with the land owners, the Water Board selected a committee that would be viewed as credible and acceptable to both parties. Even so, since the appraisal committee was employed by the Board, it was viewed with suspicion among land owners. During negotiations with some farmers in 1926, the credibility of the committee's prices was questioned: "You hired that committee; we had nothing to say about it.. .if you people hire these men, you expect them to go into the field and do as you tell them don't you?" Both the appraisals and the committee often were rejected: "They have been your committee for a long time. Let us forget them." 22 During the valuation process, Board land agents would collect information about each farm-location, water rights, amount of irrigated land in cultivation, pasture, "brush" land, orchards, improvements, and submit the information to the Appraisal Committee. The Committee, in turn, would compare this information with that for similar farms that had already been purchased to arrive at an "appraised value." The Water Board generally used a fixed multiple, usually 4.1 times appraisal value, to determine its offer or bid price. 23 The Board instructed its land agents to offer prices that
were comparable to what had been paid for similar farms in that region: "It is also to be understood that these properties are to be appraised in the same manner and on the same basis that you have appraised other properties of substantially the same character and in accordance with previous values...." 24 The Board repeatedly resisted adjusting prices beyond what it had offered for other lands in an area.
Nevertheless, land owners challenged the committee's appraised values, and called instead for binding arbitration in price disputes, using outside arbitrators.
Challenges were based on disputes both regarding the relevant comparison properties, as well as assessment of individual farm characteristics. For example, one owner, who had been offered $3,100 for her property, complained that a neighbour had been offered $10,500, even though he had 1.25 acres less than her, with only 2 inches of water from the ditch, while she had 3 inches. 25 Another wanted her land appraised against a different group of properties, selecting five farms whose owners had received more than she had been offered. 26 The disparities between the bid and ask prices due to measurement disputes could sometimes be very large. Owners of the 160-acre Parker ranch asked for $30,000 for the property and improvements. Land agents for the Water Board offered $11,496. At least part of the gap was based on the absence of comparison purchases in the area. Although the owners lowered their ask price to approximately $23,000, negotiations languished for at least four years. 27 In another case, J.T. Otey rejected a bid of $11,200 for his 50-acre farm, claiming it was undervalued by the Board. Using prices paid for neighboring properties he countered with an ask price of $18,338.56, and held out for two years, selling the farm to the city for $ 19,000. 28 In 1925, farmers who were in conflict with the Board over price asked that the two sides set up a "valuation commission" to resolve their valuation conflicts, saying that "no more honest attitude can be taken by either party." Even the special Appraisal
Committee agreed, but the Board rejected this offer, claiming that "valuation by third party would mean abandonment of purchase plan adopted with concurrence of your committee and thus far followed in dealing with your neighbors." In contrast to negotiations with pool members, sales agreements with non ditch, non pool farm owners appear to have gone smoothly. Indeed, the Water Board reported that "the prices paid, with few exceptions, have been entirely satisfactory to the seller."
Many of the 869 farm properties purchased between 1916 and 1934 were not on ditches or in pools. In the data set used below of 595 farms, 228 were not on ditches. These farms were purchased for their ground water and any riparian claims. Non-ditch properties tended to be the least productive in the region, and they received the lowest prices per acre of land as indicated in Table 1 .
Part of the reason for smooth agreement for purchase of non ditch properties was the Board's fear of adverse court rulings under Santa Barbara v. Riverside, 186
California, 7, 15 (1921) . Under that ruling any land owner who could demonstrate damage due to the drawdown of the water table from pumping and export of water by another party could secure an injunction halting all ground water pumping in the region.
To maintain the flow of groundwater to the aqueduct the Board quickly purchased properties whenever pumping injunctions were threatened by land owners.
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Another reason the ease of negotiations with these farmers was that they were better able to link their water with farm sales values. As described below, the Los Angeles Water Board had to pay a minimum price for a farm in order to induce a land owner to sell and release his water. Because these farmers had limited water supplies the implicit per acre foot price of water received (farm sales price/water acre feet) was the highest in Owens Valley (Table 1) .
Third-Party Effects.
Third-party effects involved issues of search (determining the relevant parties) measurement (assessing the extent of damage) and negotiation (agreeing on based on what they believe to be the value of water in Los Angeles.
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F. Disputes will center on water valuation and involve farms with the largest amounts of water.
A related bargaining implication is that in negotiations with farmers, the Water Board will adhere to a pricing rule that paid the same price for all similar properties.
V. Empirical Analysis of Bargaining for the Transfer of Land and Water Rights:
Timing and Prices Paid Per Acre.
In the analysis of bargaining between the Water Board and Owens Valley fanners, the data set of farm properties purchased between 1916 and 1934 by the Board includes 869 observations. Dropping those properties less than ten acres as not being farms, but town lots (analyzed separately elsewhere) as well as dropping incomplete entries leaves 595 observations. Of those 367, farms were on ditches and 228 were not on ditches, but scattered throughout Owens Valley. Table 1 provides mean values for farm property owners in Owens Valley by various classifications. Table 1 As indicated by the mean values in the table, farms on ditches sold for higher prices per acre and greater total prices than did those that were not on a ditch. The former had higher percentages of cultivated land; had more water per acre of land; and their owners were more likely to be in a sellers' pool. Those fanners who were in the Keough pool commanded the highest price per acre of land; they sold the latest (held out the longest); and had the most water per acre to offer Los Angeles. Members of the other two pools, Cashbaugh and Watterson, also did better on average in terms of price per acre and total purchase price than did non ditch properties. Even non pool members who were on ditches earned more in total and per acre of land than did the non-ditch farmers.
These farmers benefited from the early actions of the Water Board to purchase their farms before joining a pool.
In contrast, non ditch properties sold for less in total and per acre of land. They typically had a smaller share of cultivated farmland, earned less water, and their owners were unorganized. Although they received less for their land, these farmers earned more per water acre foot than did farmers more favorably located on ditches. This outcome reflects the purchase of a bundled asset in the land market. At minimum the Board had to pay a price that equaled the agricultural value of a farm in order to secure it and its water from the owner. If not all additional water on a farm translated directly into increased agricultural production, then farmers with less water were likely to receive more per unit of water than did their counterparts who had larger water endowments.
This issue is examined in the econometric analysis below, but the mean values in Table 1 are suggestive that added water increased farm values at a declining rate. For non ditch, less productive farms, the average farm sale price was $19,890, and this leads to an implicit $473/a.f. water. The total farm sale price is somewhat less than the mean 1925 census farm value for the four comparable Great Basin counties (Lassen, California;
Churchill, Douglas, and Lyon, Nevada) of $21,167, but these non ditch farms were the least productive units in Owens Valley. A sale value of nearly $20,000 corresponded to 6 years of gross farm receipts for Inyo County farms during a time of agricultural depression.
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It is no wonder then that non ditch farmers sold quickly whenever they had an offer, without discord.
The mean sales values for pool farms on ditches were higher than for non pool farms, and all ditch farmers received more in total than did their non ditch colleagues, were also the farms most likely to be involved in valuation disputes over agricultural value, delaying sale. Owners of farms with more cultivated acreage, however, should receive higher prices per acre, all else equal. The impact of farm size on time of sale is indeterminate, but it should reduce the per acre sale price because smaller farms tended to have more valuable improvements, including buildings and specialty crops. Greater amounts of water per acre on a farm should speed sale and raise the price paid for the land, all else equal. These were the farms of most interest to the Board. The squared term tests for non-linearity and the possibility that additional water would add to farm value at a declining rate. Additionally, holding riparian water rights should both speed sale and raise the sale price per acre. Membership in sellers' pools should delay sale relative to the baseline of non-ditch farms and bring higher per acre prices. Drought conditions and population growth also should speed sale. Table 2   Table 3 As shown in panel 3a, farms with more cultivated acreage were sold later, while Although the data are not consistently provided for all the observations across the groups there is enough information for further assessment of the relative effectiveness of pool members in their negotiations with the Water Board. Table 4 The data in Table 4 are suggestive of the price adjustment process by the Board in bargaining with pool members. For the less effective Cashbaugh pool (in terms of the price premium shown in Table 3b ), the price offered by the Water Board was virtually equal to the adjusted appraisal values (4.1 times appraisal according to the pricing rule), whereas for the more intransigent Keough pool members, the Board raised its offer by 45 percent on average from the appraisal value in an effort to secure the properties. Table 5   Table 5 reports the results of a regression of the ratio of the ask-to-final purchase price against a constant and a number of control variables, including pool membership for 135 farms. The results indicate that pool membership allowed those farm owners to get more than they initially asked for. They were able to do so by successfully holding out for an even higher price, whenever the Board rejected, their initial demands. The results confirm also that the Keough Pool was a stronger sellers' group. The mean ask-topurchase ratio for the entire group was 1.19. The coefficient results suggest that a Keough pool member had a 'ask-to-final price ratio of .86 and a Cashbaugh member had a ratio of .98.
All told, the analyses of the year of purchase, the purchase price per acre, and price negotiations are consistent with the implications drawn from the analytical framework outlined above. They explain which properties were purchased first, which held out, which received the most per acre, and which gained the most in price discussions. They also indicate which properties would involve the most contentious negotiations in addressing valuation disputes, especially regarding water, and bi-lateral monopoly conditions in Owens Valley. The negotiations over these properties helped to
give the Owens Valley water transfer its contentious history.
VI. Impact of the Water Transfer: An Assessment.
Los Angeles spent more than $18,580,000 through 1934 for agricultural properties, and more that $5,800,000 for town parcels. 54 Watterson) to capture more of the rents associated with their water holdings. These farmers were the center of negotiation conflicts with the Water Board, and although they had some of the largest holdings of water in Owens Valley, they received less per acre foot of water than did either the non ditch fanns or those farmers on ditches who were rewarded by the Board for selling and not joining a pool. In the bi-lateral monopoly negotiations that ensued, pool farmers were able to secure higher per acre land prices than the baseline, but not enough to fully compensate them for their greater water endowments.
VII. Concluding Remarks: Lessons of Owens Valley for Understanding Transaction Costs and Water Transfers.
The bargaining framework suggests why the Owens Valley negotiations were so rancorous, with such a negative legacy. There were critical problems of search, measurement, and negotiation. The farm lands were heterogeneous and there were intense disputes over valuation and hence, individual shares of the observed potential gains from trade. 60 The most contentious negotiations took place within bi-lateral monopoly conditions. Neither party could leave the exchange, but both had sharply "different prices in mind, with the most valuable properties, carrying the most water, holding out for higher prices than initially offered by the Water Board. The price gaps could not be easily narrowed because of competition over rents and a lack of trust between the parties that made them suspicious of the offers of both sides with little means of resolving the suspicion. And there were third-party effects on the towns and uncertainty about their credibility and magnitude.
The legacy of the transfer has been a very negative one. Despite evidence that indicates both parties to the exchange benefited, the perceived assessment is one of theft.
This view derives both from the inability of those farmers with the most water to secure commensurate increases in the values of their farms and from the imbalance in the distribution of the total returns. The overall gains to Los Angeles were 40 times or more than those of Owens Valley from the redistribution of water. The perception of unfairness over the terms of trade also was driven by the nature of supply and demand for water. Urban users had relatively inelastic demand, whereas farmers competing for sale had comparatively elastic export supply. Hence, Los Angeles residents gained considerable consumer surplus from the transaction.
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The effort of farmers to gain more of the rents in negotiation explains the formation and relative greater success of the sellers' pools.
When the gains from trade are very large, distributional issues in search, measurement, and negotiation move to the forefront as they did in Owens Valley negotiations. Generally, it may be the case that trades are smoother when the benefits are shared reasonably equally, but encounter more difficulties in completion when the distribution is very skewed toward one party.
62
This situation appears to be an issue in contemporary water transfer efforts.
Although valuation issues and bi-lateral monopoly factors complicate measurement and negotiation between urban areas and irrigation districts, key inhibiting factors are third-party effects. Concerns about the impact of water sales and farmland fallowing on agricultural labor and adjacent communities play key roles in limiting transfers.
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Conflicts center on identifying who has legitimate damage claims, the size of the damagi and the amount of compensation to be paid.
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As in Owens Valley, such compensation demands that shift the distribution of the overall gains from trade are difficult to bound, assess, and measure. Naturally, they are controversial. The long and tortuous record of negotiations underlying the Owens Valley water transfer, despite large gains from exchange, provides evidence of the importance of transaction costs in determining the timing, extent, and terms of trade.
